Medically Acceptable Temporal Relationship legal definition - Quimbee
The question now arises when and how temporal relations and temporal .. might take place, because the meaning of the subordinate state phrase (e.g., be sick. The developmental difficulties in understanding the temporal relationship a non-ambiguous word, having always a temporal meaning, and is therefore easier . We introduce a novel matching, spatio-temporal relation- ship match, which is .. meaning that it forms an interval when projected to the time axis. Further, since.
The doctrine maintained in this book is that all forms of sensations are immediately suggestive of spatial attributes, e. We include in touch, when thus mentioned, all the cutaneous sensations and the motor, or kinaesthetic, sensations.
Time and Cross-Temporal Relations « Mimesis International
As a matter of fact, however, the temperature and pain sensations, considered apart from pressure and sensations of movement, are ordinarily negligible elements. When involved in conjunction with pressure, they often modify our perceptions materially.
Taste we throw out of court at once, because taste stimuli practically involve invariably the stimulation of cutaneous sensations of contact and temperature. We cannot, therefore, submit the matter to unambiguous introspective analysis. Smells we undoubtedly classify at times in ways suggesting spatial attributes. The smell of illuminating gas seems somehow a more massive, extensive sort of thing than the odour of lemon peel.
But if one lessens the disparity in the intensity of the two odours, by getting just the merest whiff of the gas and inhaling freely and deeply of the lemon odour, the spatial difference between the two begins to evaporate.
There can be no question but that we tend to think of the more intense and more widely diffused odour as the larger. Nor is this remarkable, since we find in it actually occupying more of the atmospheric space about us. But when we note that with mild intensities of odours their spatial suggestiveness wanes; when we further note that we have no definite impressions of size, much less of shape, under any conditions; and finally when we remark that even our ability to localise odours is extremely imperfect, we may well question whether smell has itself any properly space quality.
The case of auditory space is similar to that of smell. We are told, for instance, that the tones of the lowest organ pipes are far larger, far more voluminous, than those of the high shrill pipes. A base drum sounds bigger than a pennywhistle, a lion's roar than the squeaking of a mouse, etc. Such illustrations, when adduced as evidence of the spatial character of sounds, evidently contain three possible sources of error.
In the first place, we often know something about the causes of these sounds, and we tend to transfer the known size of the producing object to the supposed size of the sound.
Secondly, and of far more consequence, sounds affect other organs than those of the internal ear, especially when they are loud or of deep pitch. Powerful tones thus jar the whole body, and are felt all over.
Moreover, vibrations of the drum membrane of the middle-ear undoubtedly set up crude sensations of pressure, or strain, to which we may come to attach a spatial significance associated with the sound. Add to this, thirdly, the fact that we readily convert judgments based upon the intensity of sounds into judgments about their extensity just as in the case of smell, and one has a large mass of considerations leading to scepticism concerning the genuineness of intrinsic auditory space relations.
Of courseone doubts that we localise sounds, and of the factors involved in this process we shall have more to say presently. But the fact that certain sounds are located within the head e. But these cases are certainly capable of explanation by means of the intra-cranial sensations set up in pressure nerves by bone vibrations, and by the effect of the imagination, visual and otherwise.
Taken alone, such evidence could hardly be conclusive. If we come back, then, to ordinary introspection, we find that all which the most ardent partisans of an auditory space can claim is a much emaciated form of the visual and tactual article. A vague sense of volume, or mass, much vaguer even than that given by mere temperature, with some crude sense of position, would seem to be the utmost capacity.
Any sense of contour or shape or exact size, any ability to measure, is lacking. Clearly such a space, even if genuine, which we doubt, would ill deserve to be ranked beside the space of sight and touch. The manner in which we localise sound may best be described after we have analysed visual and tactual space.
Growth of Space Perception. Nevertheless, this is unquestionably the fact. Babies evidently have no precise perceptions of space until they have acquired a considerable degree of motor control; and even then their appreciation of large expanses and distances is often ludicrously inexact.
The child reaching in good faith for the moon is the stock illustration of this sort of thing. Immediately after the operation such persons are almost wholly at a loss for impressions of size, shape, or distance.
After the hands have explored the objects seen, and the eyes have been allowed to pass freely to and fro over them, these spatial impressions gradually begin to emerge and take on definiteness.
By the use of properly arranged lenses and prisms experiments of various kinds have been made on normal persons, showing that we can speedily accommodate ourselves to the most unusual inversions and distortions of our visual space.
We can thus learn to react properly, although all the objects, as we see them, are upside down and turned about as regards their right and left relations. The new relations soon come to have the natural feeling of ordinary perceptions. These observations show very strikingly that there is noth. Moreover, it is easy to demonstrate that the space relations, as we perceive them by different senses, are far from homogeneous.
Indeed, the impressions which we gain from the same sense are often far from being in agreement. Nevertheless, we feel our space relations to be objectively homogeneous, a result which could hardly come about under such circumstances of sensory disparity without the harmonising effects of experience.
To illustrate the edge of a card pressed gently upon the forearm will feel to the skin shorter than it looks. The same card, if the finger tip is allowed to run slowly along it, will feel longer than it looks.
The disappointing disparity between the cavity of a tooth, as it feels to the tongue and appears to the eye, or feels to the finger-tip, is a notorious instance of the same thing. The tongue and the finger-tip both give us pressure sensations. Yet they give a very different report of the same object. Similarly, objects seen upon the periphery of the retina appear smaller than when seen by the fovea; and often they undergo a certain distortion in form. That we should perceive, amid all these possible sources of confusion, a fairly stable and well-ordered space world betokens unmistakably the systematising effects of experience, controlled no doubt by the exigencies of our practical interests in effective orientation.
Part Played by Movement. It requires only the most cursory examination to convince oneself that the all-important element in the building up and correlating with one another of our various spatial sensations is movement. In acquiring accurate touch perceptions, for instance, the finger-tips and hands move over the object, grasp it now in this way and now in that, until a complex set of tactual impressions has been gained from it.
Without such movement our touch perceptions are vague in the extreme. If we close our eyes and allow another person to put a series of small objects -upon our outstretched hands we receive only the most indefinite impressions of form and size and texture.
But allow us to manipulate the same objects in our fingers, and we can give a highly accurate account of them. Similarly, if we wish to compare visually the magnitude and contours of two objects we must allow our eyes to move freely from one to the other. Indeed, reflection must assure us that the vital meaning of all space relations is simply a given amount and direction of movement.
To pass toward the right means to make a certain kind of movement; to pass upward means to make another kind, etc. To be sure, we assign arbitrary measures to these relations, and we say an object is a mile away, or is a foot thick and six inches high. But the meaning to us of the mile, the foot, and the inch must always remain ultimately expressible in movement. Were it possible to get at the exact stages in the process by which the child acquires its control over space relations, we should thus secure the most penetrating possible insight into our adult space perceptions.
But as this is at present impracticable, we must content ourselves with an analysis of the factors which seem clearly involved in these adult conditions, without regard to their genetic features. The most important, and for practical purposes the most accurate, part of our touch perceptions comes from the hands and finger-tips. By moving the bands over, the various parts of the body we come to have a fairly accurate notion of their touch characteristics in terms of the hand as a standard.
Moreover, each hand touches the other, and we thus get a kind of check from touch on the tactual standard itself. Generally speaking, when two parts of our body touch each other we feel the one which is quiet with the one which is moving.
Thus, if we stroke the forehead with the fingers we feel the forehead; but if we bold the hand steady and move the bead, we feel the fingers. Now in order that we should be able to learn in these ways that a certain amount of sensation in the finger-tips means a certain area on the forehead, and, much more, that we should be able to tell with so much accuracy when we are touched what part of the body the sensation comes from, seems to depend upon what Lotze calls the "local sign.
Now this something about touch sensa. These local signs, then, are the relatively fixed elements in our space-perceiving processes.
It is by learning to correlate one group of them with another group that we can develop by experience the accuracy of our perceptions. Thus, for example, we come to learn that the stimulation of one series of local signs in the order a-b-c means a special movement of one hand over the other, say the downward movement of the right hand over the left. The same series stimulated in the order c-b-a means the reverse movement.
It must be remembered very explicitly at this point that we are including the kinaesthetic sensations of movement under the general heading of touch: But they are commonly fused in an inextricable way with the pressure sensations, so that a separate treatment of them seems hardly necessary in a sketch of this kind. He does not say to himself: But his success carries with it a recollection of the total feeling of the successful experience, and in this total feeling the local sign element is an indispensable part, even though the child is not himself definitely cognisant of the fact.
This seems to be the basis of our tactual tridimensionalitv. But despite its lesser delicacy, touch-movement undoubtedly plays an important role during childhood in furnishing interpretative checks upon our visual estimates of large areas and great distances. The visual perception of a mile, for instance, gets a practical meaning for us largely through our walking over the distance.
Moreover, although vision so largely displaces touch in our actual spatial judgments, touch always retains a sort of refereeship. When we doubt the accuracy of our visual perceptions we are likely' whenever possible, to refer the case to touch, and the verdict of this sense we commonly accept uncritically. Touch sensations we commonly refer to the surface of the body itself, although when we tap with a cane, or a pencil, we seem to have a curious kind of projection of part of our sensations out to the farther tip of the object.
Visual objects we always place outside ourselves. Even our after-images gotten with closed eyes often seem to float in a space vaguely external to ourselves. It seems necessary to assume a system of local signs for vision, comparable to those of touch-movement, although doubtless more complex. It must be admitted, however, that introspection is much more uncertain in its deliverances here, than in the case of touch, and we shall be on somewhat speculative ground in assuming the nature of this visual local signature.
It seems probable that this attribute of sensations from the Periphery of the retina consists primarily in reflex impulses, or tendencies, to movement toward the fovea, the fovea itself furnishing a peculiar feeling which serves more or less as a fixed point of reference. Certain it is that stimulation of any part of the retina tends to release movements turning the fovea toward the stimulus. The incessant and complicated movements of the eyes over the visual field must speedily render the relation of the various retinal points, as conjoined by movements, intricate in the highest degree.
But such relations as exist must pretty clearly rest on the intermediation of movements with their motor and retinal effects upon consciousness; and it seems probable, therefore, that the space value of any retinal point comes to be determined by the position it occupies in such a system of movements. Thus, a point 20' to the right of the fovea in the visual field comes to mean to us a definite kind of motor impulse. One 20' to the left, another kind of impulse, etc. Whether the visual local -sign is actually this sort of a fused retinal-kinaesthetic affair or Dot, there can be no doubt that as adults, we have a remarkably accurate sense of the general space relations of the objects in the field of view, and that we can turn our eyes with unhesitating accuracy to any part of this field.
Bishop Berkeley maintained in his celebrated work entitled " Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision "that the eye cannot give us any direct evidence of distance, because any point in the visual field must affect one point and one only in the retina, and it can affect this no differently when it is two feet away from what it does when four feet away.
Therefore, Berkeley concluded that our perception of visual distance is dependent upon our tactual-motor experiences. This view overlooks several important facts, including its plain contradiction of our common feeling about the matter. In the first place, we have two eyes, and each eve sees a part of solid objects varying slightly from that seen by the other. The psychical percept of such objects appears to be a fusion of the factors supplied by the two eyes, and we get from this source the visual feeling of solidity.
The stereoscope employs this principle, and by giving us pictures which exaggerate somewhat the disparity in the point of view of the right and left eve affords us a most startling impression of distance and volume.
Furthermore, we converge our eyes more upon near points than upon far, and the muscular strain thus, brought about may serve to inform us of differences in distance. Similarly, the muscles controlling the ] ,uses contract with varying degrees of intensity in the effort properly to focus rays of light from objects at different distances. How far our consciousness of these focussing movements is significant for our judgments of distance it is difficult to say.
But it is at least clear that there are factors operative other than those Berkeley had in mind, and the genuineness of the optical sense of distance can hardly be seriously questioned. The eye is, in short, not merely a retina, it is a binocular motor organ as well. Normally, therefore, visual perceptions are always fused stereoscopic binocular-motor experiences.
We use in actual practice other forms of criteria for distance. Thus, the apparent size of the object is used as a clue to its distance. By the apparent size of a man we may judge whether he be a mile or a hundred yards away.
Conversely, when we know the distance, we can employ it to form an estimate of the size of an object at that distance.
Medically Acceptable Temporal Relationship
Thus, if we know the approximate distance, we can be fairly sure whether the person we see is a man or a boy. We make a certain compensation for objects at considerable distances.
Things seen dimly, other things equal, are judged to be far away. Objects near at hand seen dimly in this way, as during a fog, seem much magnified in size.
We have dimness, the sign of distance, conjoined with a large image, and we consequently judge the object to be much larger than it is, because of its seeming distance. The contrary form of this confusion is experienced by persons going into the mountains for the first time. The unaccustomed atmospheric clearness renders distant objects unwontedly distinct, and so they are misjudged as much nearer and much smaller than they really are.
Our judgments of distance are seriously disturbed, also, when deprived of the assistance of familiar intermediary objects.
Persons unacquainted with the sea are wholly unable to guess accurately the distance of vessels or other objects across the water. Light and shadow give us many trustworthy indications of contour, and even the absolute brightness of the light seems to affect our judgment, bright objects seeming to be nearer than those which are less bright.
Inaccuracies of Space Perception. In many cases, indeed, the reasons for them are far from cer. Thus vertical lines are commonly judged longer than objectively equal horizontal lines. Abstract Sentence-initial temporal clauses headed by before, as in "Before the scientist submitted the paper, the journal changed its policy", have been shown to elicit sustained negative-going brain potentials compared to maximally similar clauses headed by after, as in "After the scientist submitted the paper, the journal changed its policy".
Such effects may be due to either one of two potential causes: There was indeed such a reversal, with before eliciting more negative brain potentials than after in sentence-initial clauses but more positive in sentence-final clauses. The results suggest that the sustained negativity indexes processing costs related to comprehending events that were mentioned out of order. Temporal connectives like before and after pose a special challenge to the language comprehension system, as they express relationships between multiple events.
Since events may have complicated relationships—for instance, one event may begin after but end before another—which in turn affects the way temporal expressions are used [ 2 — 6 ], the comprehension of temporal expressions, therefore, requires sophisticated temporal alignment between multiple events.
A well-known phenomenon in the comprehension of temporal connectives is that English sentences beginning with a temporal clause headed by before 1a engender greater processing cost than those beginning with a temporal clause headed by after 1b. Before the scientist submitted the paper, the journal changed its policy. After the scientist submitted the paper, the journal changed its policy. In the seminal study on this phenomenon using event-related brain potentials ERPswhich provide a measure of neural activity recorded at the scalp with precise temporal accuracy, [ 7 ] showed that before sentences like 1arelative to after sentences like 1belicited a negative-going ERP component over anterior sites on the scalp, which was sustained over the whole sentence.
Anterior negativities are often argued to be elicited by stimuli or cognitive tasks which require greater working memory resources [ 8 — 10 ], among others. The authors propose that the increased negativity elicited by before sentences is related to working memory demands and additional computation associated with having to construct a conceptual model in which the events occur in a different order than the one in which they were presented in the sentence.
In other words, 1a describes a situation in which the first event that happened is the journal's changing its policy, and the second event is the scientist's submitting her paper; in the sentence, however, these two events are mentioned in the opposite order counter-chronological order of mentionwhich leads to more difficult processing.
A variety of other research paradigms have shown similar costs for before sentences relative to after sentences. In behavioral experiments, sentences in which the order of mention of two events is different from the conceptual order in which they actually occurred are recalled less accurately [ 11 ], are read more slowly [ 12 ], and are re-enacted less accurately by children in some experiments [ 1314 ] see, however, [ 1516 ].
Using ERPs, [ 17 ] finds that an N effect related to a truth-value manipulation was attenuated in before sentences compared to after sentences, suggesting that real-world event knowledge was recruited in a different way in the context of before compared to after.
With functional magnetic resonance imaging fMRI[ 1819 ] showed greater hemodynamic activation in the caudate nucleus and left middle frontal gyrus which, together, may be involved in maintaining and manipulating representations in working memory for before sentences compared to after sentences in healthy adults.
The processing cost for before clauses in this line of research has been generally attributed to the non-isomorphic mapping between the order of mention in the linguistic string and the ordering of the actual events in the real world. However, another possibility is that the processing difference between before and after is rooted in the semantic and pragmatic differences between the temporal expressions before and after themselves.
There are several asymmetries between the semantics of before and of after [ 3 — 520 ], but the most important for present purposes is the difference in veridicality: That is to say, the after clause in 1b necessarily means that the scientist did ultimately submit her paper it entails that the event described in the temporal clause is veridical.
On the other hand, the before clause in 1a is ambiguous: Thus, as a result of the different entailment pattern of before as opposed to after, a before clause introduces temporary ambiguity as to whether or not the event described actually happened.
This point was also noted by [ 21 ] and [ 22 ], who propose that the sustained ERP negativity observed by [ 7 ] may be due not to the difficulty of realizing the conceptual order when it mismatches the order of mention, but rather may be due to ambiguity of the before clause and the concomitant working memory costs associated with holding multiple possible readings in working memory until it is possible to decide whether or not the event described in the before clause actually occurred.
Consistent with this account, [ 21 ] replicated the sustained negative effect with sentences like 1a,bbut also showed that the effect disappeared when participants instead read sentences like 3a,b in which real-world knowledge makes it clear that the event actually happened. Before the Second World War broke out, John worked at a small factory. After the Second World War broke out, John worked at a small factory. While this finding provides suggestive evidence that the sustained negativity may have been due to ambiguity, some details of the results are surprising.
Notably, the sustained negativity in ambiguous sentences—and the corresponding lack of sustained negativity in unambiguous sentences—emerged right at the beginning of the sentences; there was no point early in the epoch where unambiguous before clauses elicited a transient negativity.
The point at which the unambiguous clauses would have been disambiguated to a veridical reading, however, was generally later in the clause, presumably around the temporal clause verb for example, until the verb "broke out" was read, 3b could have had an anti-veridical continuation such as "Before the Second World War caused the extinction of humankind, a peace treaty fortunately was signed".
The fact that the unambiguous temporal clauses showed no sustained negativity at all, rather than an early emergence and later disappearance of a negativity, suggests that the lack of effect for these clauses may have been due to strategic factors as well as to unambiguity. At present, therefore, it is difficult to adjudicate between the account of the sustained negativity based on counter-chronological order of mention and that based on the ambiguity of the event described by before, as both accounts make the same predictions for sentences like 1a,b without real-world disambiguating information.
However, these accounts can be straightforwardly tested by examining sentences in which the temporal clause follows rather than precedes the main clause, such as 4a,bwhich describe the same situations as 1a,b but in the opposite order of mention: The journal changed its policy after the scientist submitted the paper.
The journal changed its policy before the scientist submitted the paper. In this case it is the order of mention in the after sentence, not the before sentence, that is counter-chronological. Thus, under the hypothesis that the sustained negativity is based on the incongruence between the conceptual order of the events and their order of mention, these sentences should show the opposite of the effects described above: On the other hand, the hypothesis that the sustained negativity is based on the ambiguity of the before clause does not predict such a reversal of the ERP effect.
Rather, under such an account, one would make the following predictions. First, it is possible that before clauses would still elicit a greater negativity than the after clauses. This is because changing the order of mention, as in 4bdoes not necessarily eliminate the veridicality ambiguity in the before-clause. For instance, 4b is still ambiguous as to whether the scientist actually submitted his paper or not maybe the journal changed its policy and then the scientist grumbled about the hassle but submitted her paper anyway, or maybe the journal changed its policy and then the scientist decided not to submit after all.
It is also possible, however, that seeing the main clause first helps to reduce the ambiguity if not completely eliminating itsince a comprehender would have more information to work with when incrementally making veridicality inferences about the before-clauses.
In this case the before and after clauses should pattern similarly to each other. Crucially, in neither case would a larger negativity on the after clauses relative to the before clauses be predicted. Thus, while sentence-final temporal clauses like those in 4a-b do not necessarily test a positive prediction of the veridicality-based account since that account does not necessarily predict before clauses to be more difficult than after clauses in sentence-final temporal clausesthey do at least test a positive prediction of the order-of-mention account that is not made by the veridicality-based account.
Thus far, only behavioral experiments have examined sentence-final temporal clauses like 4a,b. Most such studies have found a reversal in terms of reading times [ 12 ], act-out accuracy in children [ 14 ], or recall accuracy [ 11 ] as predicted by counter-chronological order of mention account: On the other hand, adults in the study by [ 14 ] showed better performance on after than before across the board, regardless of the order of mention, consistent with before-ambiguity account. Thus, the extant behavioral literature is somewhat equivocal between the two accounts.
The present study tests the order-of-mention and ambiguity hypotheses by examining ERPs elicited while participants read sentences with sentence-initial temporal clauses like 1a,b and sentence-final temporal clauses 4a,b for comprehension.
All were right-handed as assessed by the Edinburgh Handedness Questionnaire [ 24 ]. All participants provided their informed consent and were paid for their participation, and experimental procedures were approved by the Institutional Review Board of New York University Abu Dhabi. Detailed demographic information about the participants is available in S1 Spreadsheet. An additional nineteen participants took part in the study but were not included in the final data analysis: While the proportion of participants removed from data analysis for artifact was high compared to many studies, this is not surprising given that we analyzed a large epoch see section 2.
As for the decision to exclude early bilinguals, given the very heterogeneous language profile of our participant population in Abu Dhabi, at the outset of the study we recruited anyone who self-reported as a native English speaker because we were worried we would not find sufficient participants if we only used early monolinguals who, according to self-report, were not exposed to a second language until adulthood.
When it became clear later in the data collection process that there would be enough early monolingual participants, we decided to exclude bilinguals from the analysis given that the different temporal clause structures in their language for instance, many of these participants were speakers of languages with head-final temporal clauses, where the equivalent of before or after would come at the end of the clause may influence their processing strategy.