Polish-Russian Relations and the Burden of History: A Neighbour’s View | ISPI
Introduction - Historical unity of Russia and Ukraine; Intertwined identities; Culture and Ties. 6. West-East Ideological Schism - Ukraine and Nationalism. 7 . . aspects that form the respective identities of the two nations. Russian President Vladimir Putin (right) and his Ukrainian counterpart, form a unity government and restore a constitution drafted in interest to Russia — reasons that have more to do with history, faith, economics and culture. Historically, those ties date back to before the Soviet Union — and. Historical International Relations Russians in general are mostly familiar with Ukraine from Russian-language Related Questions (More Answers Below).
I will argue that social environment, in which the interstate interactions between Russia and Ukraine are taking place, resembles an anarchy of rivals, forcing the actors to engage themselves into the reproduction of the conflict-nurturing discoursing practices, even when the dispute itself originates, for example, purely from the clash of economic or even private interests that can be settled successfully by the quantitative bargaining on the elite level.
Constructing Continuity from Russian Empire through Soviet Union to Russian Federation There is a consensus among international relations students that Russia has faced a sever identity crisis after the break-up of the Soviet Union.
Search for Russian identity, or rather its formation was inherited task for its political and cultural elite. At the same time the coherent base for such formation was absent: This view is primarily based on the assumption that the peculiarities of Russian empires both the tsarist and the Soviet ones diverted Russians from the task of their own consolidation and nation building, while conquering and ruling huge territories with diverse populations Tolz The loss of these territories and people left Russia without the identity of its own, and the crises was enhanced by the structural drive for Russia to establish its succession both from the Russian Empire and the USSR Fofanova and Morozovwhile the Soviet identity was partly constructed through the negation of the former.
These clashes are not newly created by the Soviet Union collapse, but rather enhanced by it. It was based on the idea of Russian Christian 7 Messianism and was inspired by German Romantic national thinking Neumannxi- xii.
More than that, the ties between the state and the people are perceived as organic and are described in terms of continuation. The persistence of this paradigm of thinking in Russian contemporary public discourse can be illustrated by the position of Nikita Mikhalkov, a leading Russian filmmaker, who occupies several public or given the character of the state-civil society relations in Russia rather semi-official positions ranging from the Head of the Russian Cinematographers' Union to the Head of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defense.
State ideology was inseparable from the Orthodox world view, from the symphonies of the Kingdom and Priesthood.
It is worth noticing that in line with this understanding that the unity of the Russian land, its people and the religion is organic, contemporary high Russian Orthodox Church ROC clergy strives to enlarge its influence far beyond the spiritual realm in the society.
The inverse process is possible as well. An important implication of this in the context of the search for Russian identity in the post-Cold War era is that the contradictions between Russian Empire and the Soviet Union identity complexes are not as insuperable as it may seem for the first sight. Consider, for example, that in Russian Orthodox Church canonized the last Russian emperor Nikolaj II and his family, despite the fact he ordered to shoot into the crowd during the peace demonstration inkilling and wounding several thousand innocents.
At the same time, the textbook reform of revises the role of Stalin 10, the cruelest representative of the regime that executed Nikolaj II, and portrays the dictator in the more positive way than ever after Brezhnev times. Another important aspect of the lines of identity debates in Russia is that the Liberal and the Romantic nationalist frameworks are incompatible on their core questions Neumann Rewriting history of Russia.
Finrosforum, December 26,http: If so, resting upon Romantic nationalism ideas, Russia today can not define itself in terms of a nation-state not only due to the contradicting historical legacies, but also because the dominant so called Romantic nationalist framework fundamentally rejects this type of identity.
Both of these visions imply the perception of Russia as a civilization-like entity, playing the main role in a kind of world teleological historical development. That is why for the purpose of this research I will concentrate on the European- centered vision of Russia in the further discussion. It is interesting to note that Kyiv is even named as the second capital of Russian state in the Wikipedia article after Novgorod. However, despite these praised ancient that is medieval European origins, Russia entered the scene of the European powers late, when the leading parts had been already casted.
According to Neumannthe first instance of such challenge by Muscovites appeared in the middle 15th century.
Russia–Ukraine relations - Wikipedia
Muscovy, on the contrary, defended it till the end and, thus, was morally superior to the rest of Europe. Both doctrines strengthened the perception of the Russian land zemlya russkaya being sacred as it hosted the only remaining true church that is the state church.
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However, Europeans were, for the most part, not eager to grant recognition to Russia More than that, Europe expected Russia to comply with the standards Russia did not take part in establishing including those of democracylimiting its role to the norm-taker position Haukkala and imposing on Russia the view, which was inherently conflicting with its ambitious self-perception.
According to the provisions of the constructivist theory, the unsatisfied recognition demand should be expected to push Russia to challenge the existing international structures. Ukraina — ne Rossija. Vremya, 17 For example, see Valko Kravchenko.
History of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. As for the opposition, or, at least differentiation of Ukrainian history from the Soviet grand-narrative of glorious mighty and achievements, the case of Holodomor — the interpretation of the artificial famine of in Ukraine — logically comes in focus. Interestingly, when compared to the analogues entry on Russia, the Wikipedia article on Ukraine in its Ukrainian-language version looks less state-centered, concentrating mostly on the history of the territory which is already called Ukrainian referring to medieval erarather than the state Indeed, Ukraine features the sharp identity divide between its Central and Western provinces on the one side, and the Southern and Eastern ones on the other.UK Russia spy poisoning controversy & USA Russia tense relations - International relations Current
A leading contemporary Ukrainian intellectual Mykola Ryabchuk describes the difference in a bold, but straightforward way: Eastern Ukrainians tend to prefer the opposite views. These events are referred to as "the fourth Polish Partition" conducted by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.
In the years the Stalinist repressions of the security apparatus have been launched against Polish population of the eastern territories of Poland. The new frontiers of Central and Eastern Europe have been outlined by leaders of the great powers of the anti-German alliance during the conferences in TehranYalta and Potsdam Despite the fact that Poland formally belonged to the winners of the WWII, its eastern borders were also changed in accordance with the so-called Curzon line, or along the river Bug.
The Federation confines on the north-east with Poland: In the meantime, due to large enlargement of the eastern border of Poland has become an important element of the new eastern borders of the European Union. Since the fall of the USSR to the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century Polish-Russian relations were very harsh. The President argued that Georgia was the first of the victims but later the Russian tanks could appear, in an order of succession, in Ukraine, the Baltic States and finally in Poland.
The issue of Smolensk catastrophe remains one of the most important problems of Polish-Russian relations. InUkraine agreed to voluntarily remove over 3, tactical nuclear weapons. The first was the question of the Crimea which the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic had administered since This however was largely resolved in an agreement that allowed for Crimea to remain part of Ukraine, provided its Autonomous Republic status is preserved.
The second major dispute of the s was the city of Sevastopolwith its base of the Black Sea Fleet. After several years of intense negotiations, in the whole issue was resolved by partitioning the Black Sea Fleet and leasing some of the naval bases in Sevastopol to the Russian Navy until In the Friendship Treatywhich fixed the principle of strategic partnership, the recognition of the inviolability of existing borders, respect for territorial integrity and mutual commitment not to use its territory to harm the security of each other, was signed.
Later after new treaties came into effect, Ukraine's gas debt arrears to Russia were paid off by transfer of some nuclear-capable weapons that Ukraine inherited from the USSR, to Russia such as the Tu strategic bombers. Dependence was particularly strong in energy.
Up to percent of annually consumed gas and close to 80 percent of oil came from Russia.