Why India and Pakistan Hate Each Other – Foreign Policy
India and Pakistan are neighboring countries that share much history and culture, but are very different politically; difference appears to be. relations ofJapan with India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have been chiefly economic in nature From time to time Japanese relations with India and. Pakistan (and .. grant of $2 million compared to the $ million given to India. However . million commitment for relief and rehabilitation in contrast to the immense sums. Terrorism and its Impact on Pakistan-India Relations Of course, a basic reason for this stark difference between the two neighboring South.
The seventeen-day war caused thousands of casualties on both sides and witnessed the largest engagement of armored vehicles and the largest tank battle since World War II. Niazithe commander of Pakistan Eastern Commandsigning the instrument of surrender in Dhaka on 16 Decin the presence of India's Lt. This war was unique in the way that it did not involve the issue of Kashmir, but was rather precipitated by the crisis created by the political battle brewing in erstwhile East Pakistan between Sheikh Mujibur RahmanLeader of East Pakistanand Yahya Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhuttoleaders of West Pakistan.
This would culminate in the declaration of Independence of Bangladesh from the state system of Pakistan. Following Operation Searchlight and the Bangladesh atrocitiesabout 10 million Bengalis in East Pakistan took refuge in neighbouring India.
Pakistan attacked at several places along India's western border with Pakistan, but the Indian Army successfully held their positions. Within two weeks of intense fighting, Pakistani forces in East Pakistan surrendered to the joint command of Indian and Bangladeshi forces following which the People's Republic of Bangladesh was created. Kargil War Commonly known as the Kargil War, this conflict between the two countries was mostly limited. During earlyPakistani troops infiltrated across the Line of Control LoC and occupied Indian territory mostly in the Kargil district.
India responded by launching a major military and diplomatic offensive to drive out the Pakistani infiltrators. Some have bordered on all-out war, while others were limited in scope. The countries were expected to fight each other in after warlike posturing on both sides, but full-scale war did not break out. An insurgency in Kashmir has been a cause for heightened tensions. India has also accused Pakistan-backed militant groups of executing several terrorist attacks across India.
Further clashes erupted in the glacial area inand as Pakistan sought, without success, to oust India from its stronghold. The dispute lies in the interpretation of the maritime boundary line between Kutch and Sindh. After India's independence inSindh became a part of Pakistan while Kutch became a part of India.
Pakistan lays claim to the entire creek as per paras 9 and 10 of the Bombay Government Resolution of  signed between the then Government of Sindh and Rao Maharaj of Kutch. Most violations occur due to the absence of a physical boundary and lack of navigational tools for small fishermen. Hundreds of fishermen are arrested by the Coast Guards of both nations, but obtaining their release is difficult and long-winded owing to the hostile relations between the two nations.
The princely state of Junagadhwhich had a Hindu majority and a Muslim ruler acceded to Pakistan on 15 Septemberclaiming a connection by sea. Pakistan's acceptance of the Instrument of Accession was seen as a strategy to get a plebiscite held in Kashmir which had a Muslim majority and a Hindu ruler.
Following communal tensions Indian military entered the territory which was protested by Pakistan as a violation of International law. Later a plebiscite was held and the accession was reversed for the state to join India.
The terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 Decemberwhich India blamed on the Pakistan-based terrorist organisations, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammedprompted the — India—Pakistan standoff and brought both sides close to war. Following ten coordinated shooting and bombing attacks across MumbaiIndia's largest city, tensions heightened between the two countries since India claimed interrogation results alleging   Pakistan's ISI supporting the attackers while Pakistan denied it.
On 18 Septembermilitants attacked the Indian Army's brigade headquarters at Urikilling 19 soldiers.
The attack came after two months of extreme unrest in Kashmir, caused due to the killing of Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani in an encounter with Indian security forces. Holbrooke, was persona non grata in India, where "Indian officials were so irritated with his mandate that they made it inconvenient for Holbrooke to visit New Delhi.
But Holbrooke was keen on taking a regional approach — something that the Pakistanis themselves welcomed. Pakistan has always wanted the United States to serve as mediator in its conflict with India.Pakistani public comparing India and Pakistan
The India policy apparatus within the U. Holbrooke finally made it to India in July By that time, he understood that getting it right in Afghanistan meant that India and Pakistan had to start talking — and President Obama and Hillary Clinton agreed.
Holbrooke wanted to host a "quadrilateral" dialogue between the United States, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan that would be similar to the trilateral dialogue he had initiated between the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
It was the only way, Holbrooke thought, to fix Afghanistan, where India-Pakistan tensions bolstered local conflicts. Despite minor fits and starts until the day Holbrooke died in December that year, the talks never happened.
India vs. Pakistan
Part of the problem went back to what Cohen calls American "organizational pathologies," such as the creation of the SRAP office, which was debilitating for South Asia policy as a whole. It led to "segmented and uncoordinated policymaking," in which offices covering India and Pakistan in the State Department and White House were unable to reconcile opposing viewpoints, became overly turf-conscious, and took on client-like relationships with the countries they worked on.
The memory of the attacks lingered, and lethargic legal systems in both countries meant justice was slow. InIndia eventually sentenced to death and hung Ajmal Kasab, the lone surviving attacker. But the case against Pakistani facilitators involved in the attacks still lingers in the Lahore High Court. As for so many other terrorism cases, Pakistani civilians and law enforcement shy away from investigating the LeT for fear of their safety.
The Pakistani prosecutor investigating the attacks showed up dead in Levy and Scott-Clark succeed in introducing us personally to the people who died and were injured, and the police officers and government officials who failed in their rapid response.
Readers will finish the book knowing what it felt like to be there, smelling the smoke and hearing the gunfire. The Seige forces all of us to understand the visceral and violent nature of the never-ending India-Pakistan rivalry. When attackers Ajmal, Ismail, Shoaib, and Umer hijacked an Indian fishing trawler while traveling from Karachi across the Arabian Sea, their Pakistani handlers told them to kill Solanki, the Indian captain they held hostage.
All of them were blooded. Just as shocking as the raid itself are the chapters tracking the footsteps of David Headley, the troubled Pakistani American who performed the reconnaissance, and the lives of the LeT militants who conducted the attacks. The poverty and disenfranchisement that Kasab and his fellow attackers came from in Pakistan is even more worrisome for India.
Given its troubled economic trajectory, Pakistan will always have plenty of Kasabs wanting to fight India — no matter how scared of blood they really are. Finally, groups like LeT will always find a way to get God on their side. For example, which parts of the Pakistani military deal with LeT? How high up the chain of command do the relationships go?
Does LeT ever resist Pakistani directives? The reader becomes more aware of these problems but not much smarter as to their answers.
Terrorism and its Impact on Pakistan-India Relations – AsiaPortal
In all fairness, answering these questions may be beyond even Levy and Scott-Clark, who prove themselves to be worthy investigative journalists.
Just as Levy and Scott-Clark paint a vivid picture of the life of the Pakistani militant, a parallel narrative on developments within the Pakistani security establishment would have filled in the gaps.
Such an account would show that changing patterns in terrorism are redefining some perspectives within the Pakistani security establishment towards LeT and similar organizations. In this case, Shooting for a Century does a better job of analyzing the conundrum Pakistan is in; Cohen believes that the threat of Islamic terrorism in both countries could potentially bring India and Pakistan closer together.
The reader experiences the attacks with the same sense of terror and confusion that the people of Mumbai did. Mumbai residents were the eventual casualties of a bilateral relationship gone awry.